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Abstract
Web search engines gather information from the queries performed by the user in the form of
query logs. These logs are extremely useful for research, marketing, or profiling, but at the same
time they are a great threat to the user’s privacy. We provide a novel approach to anonymize
query logs so they ensure user k-anonymity, by extending a common method used in statistical
disclosure control: microaggregation. Furthermore, our microaggregation approach takes into
account the semantics of the queries by relying on the Open Directory Project. We have tested
our proposal with real data from AOL query logs.
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1. Introduction
Web Search Engines play a decisive role in the Internet nowadays. For instance, there is
an estimate of over 113 billion searches conducted globally on the Internet during July
2009, which is up by 41% percent compared to July 2008 (SearchEngineWatch, 2009).
These numbers give some insight on the relevance and growth rate use of Web search
engines (WSE). Major WSE such as Google, Yahoo!, Baidu, or Microsoft’s Bing serve
most of the searches in the global Internet with respective shares of 67.5%, 7.8%, 7.0%,
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and 2.9% in 2008. This share is more proportional if we look for example at US figures,
where in September 2010 the share of searches was 65.4% (Google), 17.4% (Yahoo),
and 11.1% (Microsoft) (SearchEngineWatch, 2010). Web search is not only important in
the global Internet, as most sites, corporate intranets, or community portals provide local
WSEs.
The information gathered by a WSE is stored and can be used to provide personalized
search results (Gauch and Speretta, 2004), to conduct marketing research (Hansell,
2006), or provide personalized advertisement. These data, normally referred to as search
or query logs, are a great economic source for the WSE, for instance, Google had a
revenue of 21128.5 million dollars in 2008 from advertisements (Google, 2008), which
is strongly based in the information gathered by their search engine. WSEs also charge
law enforcement agencies for access to user or group profiles (Summers, 2009; Zetter,
2009).
The detailed information that can be obtained from query logs, make these data an
important threat to the privacy of the users. For instance, in 2006, AOL Research, in an
attempt to help the information retrieval research community, released over 21 million
queries from over 650,000 subscribers over a 3 month period. Although the data were
previously anonymized, they still carried enough information to be an important threat
to the subscribers’ privacy. Journalists from the New York Times were able to locate an
individual (Barbaro and Zeller, 2006) from the query logs, and several other sensitive
information was exposed. The case ended up not only with an important damage to AOL
users’ privacy, but also with a major damage to AOL itself, with several class action suits
and complaints against the company (EFF, 2009; Mills, 2006).
In this paper, we address the privacy problem exposed by the WSE query logs when
they are made publicly available, transferred to third parties, or stored for future analysis.
The main objective is to preserve the utility of the data without risking the privacy
of their users. To that end, we follow the same ideas found in statistical disclosure
control (SDC), proposing a novel microaggregation method to anonymize query logs.
This approach ensures a high degree of privacy, providing k-anonymity at user level,
while preserving some of the data usefulness. Moreover, and unlike most of the previous
work, our approach takes into account the semantics of the queries made by the user in
the anonymization process making use of information obtained from the Open Directory
Project (2010).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces microaggregation and our
motivation and approach for the semantic anonymization of query logs. In Section 3 we
detail our proposal, and Section 4 presents our results in terms of protection and utility.
Section 5 discusses the related work, and finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
1.1. Privacy Problems
The privacy problem of query logs is given by the fact that they can contain personal
information (Soghoian, 2007). For instance, a user may have searched for her city, a
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local team, a disease suffered by herself, adult content, or she can make a vanity query,
for which the user searches for her own name (Kumar et al., 2007; Soghoian, 2007). This
information, either by itself or with help of more information can allow to re-identify the
user (Frankowski et al., 2006). So the main threat exposed by a query log is to be able
to link user queries with a real identity. The anonymization process can remove a lot of
information to provide a high level of privacy to the user, but the resulting log might not
be very useful. On the other hand, a more useful log can be obtained if less information
is removed. So, there is a privacy-utility tradeoff (Adar, 2007). Query logs should be
properly protected with an anonymization process and data should remain useful.
Accordingly, any release of query logs must ensure two requirements:
• Anonymity: queries alone or with external information cannot be used to re-
identify any user.
• Usefulness: queries must contain enough true information to bear likeness to the
reality and to be minimally useful. If the information is very damaged, it loses its
reliability and value.
To make the personal information retrieval difficult, queries are usually combined
with other ones that obfuscate them. Microaggregation (Defays and Nanopoulos, 1993)
is a popular statistical disclosure control technique, which provides privacy by means
of clustering the data into small clusters and then replacing the original data by the
centroids of the corresponding clusters.
Microaggregation provides privacy comparable with k-anonymity (Samarati, 2001;
Sweeney, 2002), i.e., a query of a certain user cannot be distinguished from at least k−1
queries generated by other users. So, the identification of a user must be imprecise. In
terms of usefulness, the larger k is, the less achieved usability because the microaggre-
gated log keeps less information of each user (see Section 4.1).
2. Towards a semantic microaggregation for query logs
In this paper, we propose a novel microaggregation method for query logs taking into
account the semantics of the queries made by the users. In this section, we overview
microaggregation and discuss the motivations of our proposal.
2.1. Microaggregation
In microaggregation, privacy is ensured because all clusters have at least a predefined
number of elements, and therefore, there are at least k records with the same value. Note
that all the records in the cluster replace a value by the value in the centroid of the
cluster. The constant k is a parameter of the method that controls the level of privacy.
The larger the k, the more privacy we have in the protected data.
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Microaggregation was originally defined for numerical attributes (Defays and Nano-
poulos, 1993), but later extended to other domains, for example, to categorical data in
Torra (2004) (see also Domingo-Ferrer and Torra, 2005), and in constrained domains
in Torra (2008).
From the operational point of view, microaggregation is defined in terms of partition
and aggregation:
• Partition. Records are partitioned into several clusters, each of them consisting of
at least k records.
• Aggregation. For each of the clusters, a representative (the centroid) is computed,
and then original records are replaced by the representative of the cluster to which
they belong.
From a formal point of view, microaggregation can be defined as an optimization
problem with some constraints. We give a formalization below using ui j to describe the
partition of the records in the sensitive data set X . That is, ui j = 1 if record j is assigned
to the ith cluster. Let vi be the representative of the ith cluster, then a general formulation
of microaggregation with g clusters and a given k is as follows:
Minimize SSE = ∑gi=1 ∑nj=1 ui j(d(x j,vi))2
Subject to ∑gi=1 ui j = 1 for all j = 1, . . . ,n
2k ≥ ∑nj=1 ui j ≥ k for all i = 1, . . . ,g
ui j ∈ {0,1}
For numerical data, it is usual to require that d(x,v) is the Euclidean distance. In
the general case, when attributes V = (V1, . . . ,Vs) are considered, x and v are vectors,
and d becomes d2(x,v) = ∑Vi∈V(xi − vi)2. In addition, it is also common to require for
numerical data that vi is defined as the arithmetic mean of the records in the cluster, that
is, vi = ∑nj=1 ui jxi/∑nj=1 ui j. As the solution of this problem is NP-Hard (Oganian and
Domingo-Ferrer, 2001) when we consider more than one variable at a time (multivariate
microaggregation), heuristic methods have been developed. One such method is MDAV
(Maximum Distance to Average Vector) (Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz, 2002).
Note that when all variables are considered at once, microaggregation is a way to
implement k-anonymity (Samarati, 2001; Sweeney, 2002).
2.2. Motivations of our proposal
In order to ensure the privacy of the users, we provide k-anonymity at user level
in the protected query logs. That is, in the protected logs there will be at least k
indistinguishable users.
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Open Directory Categories (1-5 of 5)
1. Sports: Soccer: UEFA: Spain: Clubs: Barcelona (11 matches)
2. World: Polski: Sport: Sporty pilki i siatki: Pilka nozna: Kluby: Hiszpan’skie: (...)
3. World: Español: Regional: Europa: España: Deportes y tiempo libre: Deportes: (...)
4. World: Deutsch: Sport: Ballsport: Fuball: Vereine: Spanien (3)
5. World: Français: Sports: Balles et ballons: Football: Regional: Europe: Espagne (3)
Figure 1: Example of ODP query result.
A key point, thus, for the microaggregation of search logs is to determine how the
users are clustered. If the users in the same cluster do not share any interest, the protected
query logs can be useless, that is, the resulting search logs are too much distorted and
we cannot obtain useful information from them.
For example, we can consider two soccer supporters, and two anti-sports users. If we
create a cluster of size two with a soccer supporter and an anti-sports user, we can obtain
non-valid results. The entries of the protected query logs are confusing. On the other
hand, if the two soccer supporters are in the same cluster, the protected logs provide
more reliable results.
Thus, we should create the groups of users taking into consideration their interests.
The users with common interests between them should be grouped in the same cluster.
In order to do so, we should be able to determine if their interests are closer, that is, we
need a tool to compute the semantic distance of two queries.
In this work, we use the Open Directory Project (ODP) (ODP, 2010) to compute
the semantic distances between users. The ODP is the most widely distributed database
of Web content classified by humans. ODP data powers the core directory services for
some of the most popular portals and search engines on the Web, including AOL Search,
Netscape Search, Google, Lycos, and HotBot, and hundreds of others. Thus, a query
result using them is hardly influenced by the ODP classification. ODP uses a hierarchical
ontology structure to classify sites according to their themes. For example, when we
search forBarcelona FC, ODP returns a list of categories to which the query belongs (Figure
1). Each result starts with a root category followed by deeper categories in the ODP tree.
Our proposal groups users with common interests using the ODP classification. We
consider that the users with common interest are those who have more terms in the same
categories.
2.3. An ODP similarity measure
In order to be able to microaggregate users from the query logs, we have to define a
distance or similarity measure between users. We introduce a similarity coefficient based
on the common categories shared between queries from each user. We also introduce
some notation here to formalize the process.
We consider the set of n users U = {u1, . . . ,un} from the query log, and their
respective set of queries Q = {Q1, . . . ,Qn}, where Qi = {qi1, . . . ,qimi} are the queries
of the user ui. Each query qij has several terms qij = {t1, . . . , tr j}.
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Given a term ts, we can obtain its classification in the ODP at a given depth. When
querying the ODP, the returned categories can be divided in depth levels. Let l be the
parameter that identifies the depth level in the ODP hierarchy. For example, if we have
the classification Sports : Soccer : UEFA : Spain : Clubs : Barcelona and l = 1, we only
work with the root category Sports; when l = 2 we work with Sports : Soccer; and so
on. We will consider a maximum depth L to restrict the search space, so l ∈ {1, . . . ,L}.
We denote as Cl = {cl1, . . . ,clpl} the set of possible categories at level l in the
ODP. Given a user ui we can obtain all the categories at level l from all queries of
the user. We denote as Cl(ui) the set of categories for user ui at level l. Note that
considering all queries of user ui, Qi = {qi1, . . . ,qimi}, and their respective sets of terms
qij = {t1, . . . , tr j} for j = 1 . . .mi, the number of categories for user ui at level l is given
by |Cl(ui)|= r1 + . . .+ rmi .
We can then define a similarity coefficient ODPsim between two given users ui and
u j as:
OPDsim(ui,u j) =
L
∑
l=1
{|cl| : cl ∈ {Cl(ui)∪Cl(u j)}} (1)
This similarity coefficient between two users computes the common categories
between them for all considered levels, that is levels up to L. Note that OPDsim is
symmetric and ranges from 0 (there is no similarity between the users) to ∑Ll=1 |Cl|
(maximum similarity between two users).
3. ODP-based microaggregation of query logs
The method we propose to protect the query logs is a microaggregation that follows the
outline of Section 2 with an extra step of data preparation. That is, our approach consists
of the following steps:
1. Data preparation.
2. Partition.
3. Aggregation.
These steps are described in detail in the following sections.
3.1. Data preparation
To easy the computation of the protected data, the data is prepared by pre-querying the
ODP to classify the user queries. Following the notation introduced in Section 2.3, for
every term ts, we can obtain its classification for all levels l ∈ {1, . . . ,L} using the ODP.
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This allows us to obtain all the categories associated to all the users in all levels, that
is Cl(ui) for all user ui ∈U , and all considered levels. Next, we create a classification
matrix that contains the number of queries for each user and category at level l, MU×Cl .
Please, note that, we obtain one matrix for every level l ∈ {1, . . . ,L}. So, MU×Cl (i, j) is
the number of times that category clj is found in the queries of user ui.
Finally, we use the MU×Cl matrices in order to compute the incidence matrix that
contains the semantic similiarity of the users MU×U . Given the incidence matrix MU×U ,
MU×U(i, j) is the number of common categories between users ui, and u j for all
depth levels l ∈ {1, . . . ,L}. Moreover note that the incidence matrix corresponds to the
similarity coefficient described in Section 2.3, that is, MU×U(i, j) = ODPsim(ui,u j).
The process works as follows:
1. Obtain the classification matrices MU×Cl using Algorithm 1.
2. Obtain the incidence matrix MU×U using Algorithm 2, i.e. the similarity coefficient
between users.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for computing the classification matrices MLU×C where L = {1, . . . , l}
Require: the maximum depth L for the ODP categories
Require: the set of users U = {ui, . . . ,un}
Require: the set of queries Qi = {qi1, . . . ,qimi} of each user ui
Require: the set of terms {t1, . . . , tr j} of each query q j
Ensure: {MU×C1 , . . . ,MU×CL}, i.e. for every level l, the matrix MU×Cl with the number of queries for each
category and user in the depth l
for l ∈ {1, . . . ,L} do
for ui ∈ {u1, . . . ,un} do
for qij ∈ Qi = {qi1, . . . ,qimi} do
for ts ∈ qij = {t1, . . . , tr j} do
obtain the categories ct at depth l for the term ts using ODP;
for each ct do
if ct ∈ MU×Cl then
MU×Cl (ui,ct) = MU×Cl (ui,ct)+1;
else
add the column ct to MU×Cl ;
MU×Cl (ui,ct) = 1;
end if
end for
end for
end for
end for
end for
return {MU×C1 , . . . ,MU×CL}.
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm for computing the incidence matrix MU×U
Require: the classification matrices {MU×C1 , . . . ,MU×CL}
Ensure: MU×U
Initialize MU×U (i, j)← 0 for all i, j = 1 . . .n;
for MU×Cl ∈ {MU×C1 , . . . ,MU×CL} do
for each column c j ∈ MU×Cl do
for each row ui ∈ MU×Cl do
for each row uρ ∈ MU×Cl do
MU×U (ui,uρ)← MU×U (ui,uρ)+min(MU×Cl (ui,c j),MU×Cl (uρ ,c j));
end for
end for
end for
end for
return MU×U .
3.2. Partition
The partition step creates groups of k users with similar interests using Algorithm 3.
Let us assume that ui and uρ are the most similar users in the set. We calculate the
users’ similarity ODPsim using the incidence matrix MU×U , (see Section 3.1). The most
similar users are those that have the highest similarity coefficient in the matrix. Next, we
include ui and uρ to the cluster. If the group size k is two, we delete ui and uρ records
from the incidence matrix and we repeat the process to obtain a new cluster. When the
group size is bigger than two, we merge the columns and rows of ui and uρ creating
a new user u′. u′ is the addition of both users, ui and uρ. Let us assume, that uξ is the
most similar user with u′. Next, we include uξ to the cluster with ui and uρ. The method
executes this process k−2 times.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm for computing the clusters Z = {z1, . . . ,zγ} of users
Require: the set of users U = {u1, . . . ,un}
Require: the incidence matrix MU×U
Require: the clusters size k
Ensure: the clusters Z = {z1, . . . ,zγ} of users for γ= ⌈n/k⌉
M′U×U ← MU×U ;
U ′ ←U ;
while |U ′| ≤ k do
obtain the cluster z of k users using the Algorithm 4 and M′U×U ;
remove the users ui ∈ z form U ′;
remove the columns and the rows of the users ui ∈ z form M
′
U×U ;
add z to the set Z;
end while
return Z = {z1, . . . ,zγ}.
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Algorithm 4 Algorithm for computing a cluster z of k users
Require: a incidence matrix M′U×U
Require: the clusters size k
Ensure: a cluster z of k users
z ← /0;
obtain the two most similar users (ui,uρ), i.e. the cell of M
′
U×U with the highest value;
add (ui,uρ) to the set z;
while (|z|< k) and (columns(M′U×U )> 0) do
for each column cs ∈ M
′
U×U do
M′U×U (cs,uρ) = M
′
U×U (cs,uρ)+M
′
U×U (cs,ui);
end for
for each row rs ∈ M
′
U×U do
M′U×U (ui,rs) = M
′
U×U (ui,rs)+M
′
U×U (uρ ,rs);
end for
delete the column uρ of matrix M
′
U×U ;
delete the row uρ of matrix M
′
U×U ;
obtain the new ui’s most similar user uρ , i.e. the cell of the user ui with the highest value;
add uρ to the set z;
end while
return z.
3.3. Aggregation
For every cluster z j formed in the partition step, we compute its aggregation by selecting
specific queries from each user in the group. That is, given the cluster of users z j =
{u1, . . . ,uk}, we obtain a new user uz j as the representative (or centroid) of the cluster,
which summarizes the queries of all the users of the cluster. The selection of queries is
based on the following principles:
1. We give priority to queries semantically close between them.
2. The number of queries a user contributes to the cluster representative is propor-
tional to the number of queries of the user.
The first principle is considered in the partition step described in Section 3.2, since
clusters are composed of users with semantically similar queries. The second principle
is formalized defining some indexes as described below.
First, the number of queries of the centroid is the average of the number of queries of
each user ui of the cluster z j. Then, the contribution of a user ui (Contribi) to the centroid
of a cluster with k users, depends on her number of queries |Qi|. This contribution is as
follows:
Contribi =
|Qi|
∑ki=1 |Qi|
(2)
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Algorithm 5 Algorithm to aggregate the k users of the cluster z
Require: a cluster z of k users
Require: the quota Quotai of each user of the cluster z
Require: the contribution Contribi of each user of the cluster z
Require: the set of queries Qi of each user of the cluster z
Require: the queries list SL
Require: the microagregged log ML
Ensure: the centroid of the cluster z
ML ← /0
for each user ui ∈ z do
SL ← sort Qi = {qi1, . . . ,qimi} by query repetitions.
while not reach Quotai do
Add the first query qi1 with a probability Contribi ×#qi1 repetitions to ML.
Delete qi1 of SL.
end while
end for
return ML.
Thus, the quota of each user ui in the new centroid uz j can be computed as:
Quotai = |Qi|k (3)
More formally, the aggregation method runs the Algorithm 5 for each cluster. First,
it sorts logs from all users descending by query repetitions. Then, for each user ui of the
cluster and while not reaching Quotai do:
1. Add the first query of her sorted list with a probability Contribi×#q j repetitions.
For example, if ui has a query repeated 3 times, and Contribi is 0.4, as 3 ·0.4= 1.2,
the method adds one query to the new log and then randomly chooses to add it
again or not according to the presence probability 0.2.
2. Delete the first query of the list.
4. Evaluation
We have tested our microaggregation method using real data from the AOL logs released
in 2006, which correspond to the queries performed by 650000 users over three months.
We randomly select 1000 users, which correspond to 55666 lines of query logs. The
usefulness evaluation and the results are presented below.
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4.1. Usefulness evaluation method
For each user we have her original set of queries and the corresponding protected ones
by means of our microaggregation method. All queries can be classified in categories,
that is, each query is classified in the L first depth levels of the ODP.
In order to verify that our method preserves the usefulness of the data (i.e., does not
introduce too much perturbation), we count the number of queries of each category,
for a given level l, that are in the original log as well as in the centroid, ρ. This
number is divided by the number of original queries in l, χ , obtaining a semantic remain
percentage (SRP) in the level.
SRP = ρ
χ
(4)
To summarize, our evaluation method does not only match two equal terms in both
logs, but also a term in the protected log that replaces one with closest semantic in the
original log. Using a random partition algorithm, users of each cluster might not be
semantically close.
Consider, as an example of the worst case, a cluster of k users {u1, . . . ,uk} with
respective queries Q = {Q1, . . . ,Qk}, such that Qi∩Q j = /0 for all i 6= j. Thus, only the
queries of a single user in a specific topic will appear in the centroid.
In this case, the number of queries of ui that appear in the centroid can be calculated
using formula 3 and it is known that the sum of all quotas is χ . Therefore, in the worst
case when no common interests between users exists, we can calculate the average SRP
as:
∑ki=1 |Qi|χ
k =
1
k (5)
4.2. Results
As discussed in Section 2.2, ODP returns a list of categories for every term (or query),
and each category is composed of various hierarchical levels. In our method, one or all
categories can be used and, for each category, either all hierarchical levels or some of
them can be considered. Intuitively, the more categories and levels (deeper levels) that
are used, the higher the computational cost should be, and, perhaps, a better SRP can
be achieved. Thus, we want to study how these parameters influence the SRP and the
computational cost:
• ODP levels: every term has a categorization up to a hierarchical level, and the
deepest level can be different for every term. The deeper the level is, the less terms
that have information in this level there are. We want to know the deepest level
that gives information for a majority of terms.
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• SRP vs. ODP-categories: we want to know the SRP value when we use more or
less categories; that is, if we use more categories, the SRP can be either higher, or
have approximately the same SRP.
• Computational cost vs. ODP-categories: supposing that more categories are used,
the higher the computational cost will be, but the extra cost should be known. If
the extra cost is not significant and a better SRP is obtained, more categories can
be used.
4.2.1. ODP levels
In the ODP, not all terms rank up to a certain level. For example, our working set
of queries has terms with two levels (minimum) and others with twelve levels (max-
imum). In the study of the above mentioned relations (SRP vs. ODP-categories and
computational-cost vs. ODP-levels), levels that do not have a ranking for the majority of
terms can be ignored because such levels only give information to improve the SRP for
a reduced number of terms. Thus, we consider a level if it has information for, at least,
the 50% of the terms (queries).
In this sense, we have calculated for every level the percentage of terms that have
a result for the level, and Figure 2 shows the percentage of queries (our working set
of queries) that can be classified up to a certain depth level in the ODP tree. It can be
observed that only 57% of queries can be classified up to the level 5. So, we only run
tests up to this level.
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Figure 2: Percentage of queries that can be classified up to a certain level in ODP.
4.2.2. SRP vs. ODP-categories
Besides some initial tests (Erola et al., 2010), we have calculated the percentage of
semantically similar queries as the accumulation of the levels; that is, we add the coinci-
dences of level 1 and 2 to calculate the percentage of semantically similar queries at level
2. In this current work, we have changed the evaluation method because we think that
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Figure 3: Semantic similarity percentage of microaggregated logs using either the first category
or the five first categories returned by the ODP.
to evaluate each level separately is better to understand the remaining similarity of the
queries in that level.
We have compared the results obtained (SRP) by either using the first five categories
returned by the ODP or using only the first one. The range is enough in order to evaluate
the SRP behaviour when we use more categories. Note that the first category that gives
ODP is the most significative for the introduced term. Figure 3 shows, for cluster sizes
2, 3, 4 and 5, the average SRP that users obtain for various levels L. The red colour
represents the obtained results using the first category returned by the ODP and the green
colour represents the obtained results using the first five categories. It can be observed
that both tests improve the theoretical SRP (see Section 4) with all depth levels. Using
more categories in the ODP classification we achieve less similarity loss for deeper
levels and larger cluster sizes. For instance, when L = 1, the same gain is obtained in
all cases, but when L = 5 and k = 5, the difference gain is approximately 10% using the
first five categories instead of only the first one.
4.2.3. Computational cost vs. ODP-categories
The computation cost is larger when more categories are used. Figure 4 shows the
average time required to microaggregate logs for cluster sizes k = 2, . . . ,5 for various
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levels. It can be determined that using the first five ODP categories, the average time is
three times larger than using only the first one.
Tests were run on a Pentium Core 2 Duo 2.2Ghz without source code parallelization.
Figure 4 demonstrates that the required time increases linearly with the number of user
queries. Nonetheless, the program could be parallelized as follows:
• Data preparation: as each user has her queries, the classification matrices MU×C
can be computed simultaneously. Then, each cell of the incidence matrix MU×U
can be calculated independently, since we have available the classification matrix
of each user.
• Partition: the partition process is linear and cannot be parallelized, but it is a
negligible part of the whole process. The time required for its calculation is less
than one percent of the total time.
• Aggregation: as users are divided into k groups, the logs’ aggregation of each
group can be run simultaneously.
Thus, the program parallelization could make the proposal scalable for very large
systems.
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Figure 4: Average required time to microaggregate logs using our method for various ODP levels.
4.2.4. Considerations
It should be taken into consideration that we have repeated the tests of the previous initial
work (Erola et al., 2010) and we have observed that the results have improved because
the ODP is constantly getting better. It now classifies more words. Furthermore, notice
that we are working with a set of 1000 users, randomly selected from the AOL files. We
expect to achieve greater SRP values working with a larger set, because more similar
users may be grouped.
It is important to remark that our proposal achieves k-anonymity (Samarati, 2001;
Sweeney, 2002) at user level, which guarantees that at least k users are indistinguishable
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in the protected version. This guarantees a high degree of privacy, preventing the famous
privacy leaks of the AOL logs.
To some readers our proposal might resemble agglomerative hierarchical clustering
methods such as the well known Ward method (Ward, 1963). This method has been also
adapted to perform microaggregation, although in another context, in Domingo-Ferrer
and Mateo-Sanz (2002).
5. Related work
There are several approaches to anonymize query logs in the literature (Cooper, 2008),
but they are normally reduced to the deletion of specific queries or logs. For instance,
in (Adar, 2007) the authors propose a technique to remove infrequent queries, while in
Poblete et al. (2008) a more sophisticated technique is introduced to remove selected
queries to preserve an acceptable degree of privacy, or in the case of Korolova et
al. (2009) to choose the publishable queries. Common techniques used in statistical
disclosure control (SDC) have not been applied to this specific problem until very
recently (Navarro-Arribas and Torra, 2009; Hong et al., 2009; Navarro-Arribas et al.,
in press, 2011). Moreover, these systems use spelling similarities to link users; that is,
two users would be grouped if they had submitted syntactic similar queries. Therefore,
they cannot distinguish different senses of a term, if it has more than one.
The use of supporting semantic taxonomies to anonymize query logs was considered
in He and Naughton (2009) where the authors anonymize the set of queries made by
a user by generalizing the queries using WordNet (Miller, 2009). WordNet is a generic
lexical database of the English language, where concepts are interlinked by means of
conceptual-semantic and lexical relations. The problem of relying on WordNet when
facing the anonymization of query logs is that the query introduced by the user, despite
the fact that they might not be in English, can be meaningless in a generic dictionary. We
think that better results can be obtained for query logs by gathering semantic information
from the Open Directory Project (ODP), which its main purpose is precisely to serve as
a catalogue of the Web by providing a content-based categorization or classification of
Web pages. This will be the case in general for data which is composed of uncommon
words, which could not be found in WordNet. Note that if all words in the query logs
were present in WordNet, the use of the WordNet framework will presumably give
good results as well. Nevertheless, we need to introduce novel approaches to make the
information obtained from the ODP useful. Unlike WordNet, which already has lots
of published and tested distances functions, or aggregation operations, ODP lacks this
extensive previous work.
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6. Conclusions
The existing microaggregation techniques for query logs do not usually take into account
the semantic proximity between users, which is negatively reflected in the usefulness of
the resulting data. This paper presents a new microaggregation method for query logs
based on a semantic clustering algorithm. We use ODP to classify the queries of all users
and then aggregate the most semantically close logs. As we have seen, the resulting logs
achieves higher usefulness while preserving k-anonymity.
We have tested our proposal with real query logs from AOL, showing some good
results. Both in terms of information loss and in terms of protection, which is guaranteed
because our method ensures k-anonymity at user level. As future work, new evaluation
methods such as as Domingo-Ferrer and Solanas (2009), will be tested to better assess
the quality of the results obtained using our system.
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